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NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
TAXATION - FEDERAL ESTATE TAX - POSSESSION AND
ENJOYMENT CLAUSE
On January 17, 1949, the Supreme Court of -the United
States clarified Some of the uncertainties of the "possession
and enjoyment" clause of the gross estate tax provisions of the
Federal Estate Tax Statute " in the companion cases, Spiegel's
Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 2 and Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue v. Church's Estate.$
In the Spiegel Case the decedent, a resident of Illinois, in
1930 had made an irrevocable transfer in trust to himself and
another as trustees, the trust income to be divided among his
three children, or their surviving issue, during the settlor's
lifetime. Upon the settlor's death the trust corpus was to be
divided equally among his three children or the surviving issue
of any decedent children should they predecease the settlor.
The trust instrument failed to provide specifically for distri-
bution of the corpus should the settlor survive the named re-
maindermen, his children and grandchildren. The Supreme
Court, following the ruling of the Court of Appeals 4 that un-
der Illinois law the property might revert to Spiegel should
he outlive all the beneficiaries, upheld the Commissioner's con-
tention that the value of the trust corpus should be included
in the decedent's gross estate. The interest retained was no
greater than a possibility of reverter arising by operation of
law, but the Court held that the transfer was not so complete,
final, absolute and irrevocable as to remove the property from
the operation of 811 (c).
126 U.S.C.A. 811(c). Transfers in contemplation of, or taking effect at death.
"To the extent of any Interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer, by trust or otherwise, In contemplation of or intended to take effect
in possp-sion or enjoyment at or after his death, or of which he has at any time
made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life
or for any period net ascertainable without reference to his death or for any
period which does not in fact end before his death (1) the possession or enjoy-
ment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the right, either
.lone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall pos-
ss or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; except In case of a bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration of money or money's worth. Any
transfer of a material part of his property In the nature of a final disposition or
distribution thereof made by the decedent within two years prior to his death
without such consideration shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have
been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this subehapter;..."
2 335 U.S. 701, 69 S.Ct. 301 (1949).
3 335 U.S. 632, 69 S.Ct. 322 (1949).
4 Commissioner v. Spiegel's Estate, 7 Cir., 159 F. 2d 257 (1947).
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The trust transfer in the Church Case was similar to that
involved in the Spiegel Case, except that in the former the
settlor reserved the income from the trust corpus to himself for
life. The trust was created in 1924, prior to the joint resolu-
tion of Congress 0 which rendered trusts includable in the
gross estate where the decedent settlor retained a life interest
in the corpus.6 The government contended that the possibility
of reverter plus the retention by the settlor of the trust income
brought the trust property within the decedent's gross tax-
able estate. Held that the trust agreement, because it reserved
a life income in the property, was intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at the settlor's death.
To 'better understand the impact of these two decisions, a
review of the cases leading to this point is appropriate. The
federal estate .tax, as distinguished from a succession, or in-
heritance tax," is levied on the transfer of something of eco-
nomic worth from the decedent to the living.8 In May v.
Heiiser,9 where the grantor had made an inter vivos transfer
in trust with a life estate reserved, a unanimous Supreme
Court held that there was not such a "transfer of an estate"
upon the settlor's death as to subject the trust corpus to the
tax under the statute.10 The Court construed the "interest"
necessary to be legal title, disregarding the passage of the
beneficial interest in the property. This position was reaffirmed
later in three per curiam decisions"1 which precipitated the
5Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. 1516, 1517.
0 February 28, 1938, the Supreme Court held that neither the passage of the
resolution nor its later inclusion in the 1932 Revenue Act was intended to apply
to trusts created before its passage. Hasset v. Welch, (Helvering v. Marshall),
303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559 (1938).
7 May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238, 50 S.Ct. 286 (1930); Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 S.Ct. 123 (1929); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531,
47 S.Ct;-710 (1928); Y.M.C.A.'v. Davis,.264 U.S. 47, 44 S.Ct. 291 (1924).
. Ray, The Estate Tax on Trasfer* Intended to Take Efiet in Possession or
Enjoyment At oO After Death: Helvering v. HaUook, 29 GA. L. J., 943, 944 (1941);
Note, 34 ILL. L. Rzv. 867 (1940).
6 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
10 " ... the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time of his death of all property ... (c) to the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, or
with respect to which he has at any time created a trust in contemplation of or
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death. . .
Revenue Act of 1918, See. 402 (c).S1 Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782, 511 S.Ct. 342 (1931) ; Moreman
v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783, 51 S.Ct. 343 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784,
51 S.Ct. 343 (1931).
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joint resolution of Congress on March 3, 1931, blocking this
portal t6 tax avoidance.,1
In Klein v. United States i3 the Court ruled that where the
grantor conveyed a life estate with a contingent remainder,
retaining the fee subject to divestment, the trust corpus was
taxable as part of the estate of the settlor. In spite of Mr.
Justice Sutherland's statement in the majority opinion that
"nothing is to be.gained in multiplying words in respect to
the various niceties of the art of conveyancing or the law of
contingent and vested remainders," four years later in Helver-
ing v. St. Louis Union Trust Co." and Becker v. St. Louis
Trust Co. 5 the Supreme Court decided that where the grantor
reserves but a possibility of reverter the trust corpus was not
taxable to the grantor's estate.'8 The net effect of these de-
cisions placed a premium on the words used in the convey-
ance, that is on the nature of the common law interest created
thereby,T rather than upon the existence of any interest which
by. its passage or destruction upon the death of the grantor
operated to enlarge the estate of the recipient.
Helvering v. Hailock is helped tb remove some of the nebu-
lous, historical disparities imposed on the estate tax law by
the juxtaposition of the Klein decision and the St. Louis Trust
Cases. The trust instruments in question provided expressly
for a possibility of reverter in the settlor upon contingencies
which would terminate only at his death. A divided Court held
that the entire trust corpus should be included in the gross
estate. the distinctions in the common law denomination of
the interest retained were no longer conclusively adopted as
12 See note 6, supra.
13 283 U.S. 231, 51 S.Ct. 398 (1981).
14 296 U.S. 39, 56 S.Ct. 74 (1935).
142-S4U.S. 48, 56 S.Ct. 78 (1935).
16 Mr. Justice Stone, in the dissenting opinion, 296 U.S. 39, 47, following the
spirit of the Klein Ca., said, "... . it would seem to be of no consequence what
particular conveyaneer's device-what particular string-the decedent selected
to hold in suspense the ultimate disposition of his property until the moment of
his death. In determining whether a taxable transfer becomes complete only at
death we look to substance, not to form." Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Brandeis
and. Cardoso joined in the dissent.
I? This result might have been foreshadowed by the per curiam decision in
Helvering v. Duke, 290 U.S. 591, 54 S.Ct. 95 (1931), upholding. decisions of the
Board of Tax Appeals, 23 B.T.A. 1104, and of the Court of Appeals, 62-.F. 2d
1057 (C.C.A. 3d 1933) that the express retention of a possibility of reverter in
the trust instrument did not bring the trust corpus within the gross taxable
estate.
18 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940).
COM MENTS
a test of taxability; if something of economic value passed at
death, the inter vivos transfer was testamentary in character.
The Court suggested that the possession and enjoyment clause
"deals with property not technically passing at death but
interests theretofore created. The taxable event is a transfer
inter vivos. But the measure of the tax is the value of the
transferred propeity at the time when death brings it into
enjoyment." This. suggestion was authoritatively applied in
Fidelity-Philadehia, Trust Co. v. Rothenies 19 and construed
to mean that "those property interests the ultimate possession
and enjoyment of which is held in suspense until the moment
of the grantor's death or thereafter" must be included in his
gross taxable estate.
While vigorously reaffirming the Supreme Court's previous
holding that the estate tax should not be governed by the
"recondite niceties" of common law property concepts, the
Hallock Case did leave several questions unanswered. The
first of these, as to what property value is to be taxable to the
decedent's estate, is definitively answered in the Fidelity Trust
Company Case: "The value of the property subject to the
contingency, rather than the actuarial or theoretical value of
the possibility of the occurrence of the contingency, is the
measure of the tax." 20
The remaining questions still undecided after the Hallock
Case were: (1) Did May v. Heiner survive Helvering v. Hal-
lock? (2) Does section 811 (c) apply to a possibility of reverter
arising by operation of law, as opposed to such an interest
created by the express intention of the grantor at the time
of the conveyance? (3) Is the mere shifting of an economic
interest upon the death of the grantor sufficient to make the
property to which it is annexed- taxable to his estate where
nothing shifts from the grantor?
(1). Since the trusts involved in the Halock Case were
created in 1919, the governing statute 21 was like that applied
in May v. Heiner. The exact status of the latter case was not
certain since there was no definite statement by the court as
to its intention, although the language of Mr. Justice Frank-
19 Where the decedent made a transfer in trust -retaining a life estate and a
power of appointment. 324 U.S. 108, 65 S.Ct. 508 (1945).
20 Id. at 112, also Commissioner v. Estate of Field; 824 U.S. 113, 116, 65 S.Ct.
511 (1945).
21 Revenue Act of 1918, Sec. 402(c); see note 10, supra.
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furter in the majority opinion was certainly broad enough to
express indirectly the intention to overrule May v. Heiner.2
The lower courts, however, had frequently cited May -v.
Heiner as controlling.23 For instance, in Helvering v. Proctor 24
Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the preponderate of the
court, said, "The opinion of the majority in Helvering v. Hal-
lock did not explicitly, or by inference from anything said de-
clared that May v. Heiner was no longer law." Recent decisions
of the Tax Court reveal that the law of May v. Heiner was
still being, applied by that tribunal.2 5 So a reasonable conclusion
would appear to be that May v. Heiner did in fact survive
Helvering v. Hallock. s
(2). That the uncertainty expressed in question (2) was
somewhat obviated by the Supreme Court in the Fidelity Trust
Case 2 7 and the Field Case 28 is indicated by the Circuit Court
decisions which relied thereon in holding that a possibility of
reverter arising by operation of law brought the'value of the
property to which it was annexed into the decedent's taxable
estate.29 The Treasury Department incorporated this construc-
22 809 U.S. 106, 111, 117, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940).
23s Blakeslee v. Smith, 110 F. 2d 364, 866 (C.C.A. 2d 1940). in U.S. v. Brown,
184 F. 2d 872, 373 (C:C.A. 9th 1943), the majority opinion states, "As late as
1938 the court, in Hassett v. Welch, appears to have regarded May v. Heiner as
subsisting authority. The court did not expressly or by necessary implication
overrule it in Heliering v. Hallock."
24 140 F. 2d 87, 88, 55 A.L.R. 845 (C.C.A. 2d 1944). However, Judge Frank
argues in his dissenting opinion that Helvering v. Hallock overruled May v Hei-
ner by clear implication.
25 Estate of Hughes, 7 T.C. 1848 (1946); Estate of Friedman, 8 T.C. 68
(1947); Estate of Cochran, 9 T.C. 242 (1947).
2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in the period since the Hallock Case cited
May v. Heiner only twice, both times by Mr. Justice Douglas in concurring opin-
ions, Fidelity Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 65 S.Ct. 108 (1945) and
Commisoner-v.-Estate of Field, 324 U.S. 113, 65 S.Ct. 511 (1945), dissenting
opinion of Judge O'Connell in Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 161 F. 2d 11, 13,
n. 8 (C.C.A. 8d 1947).
27 "It is enough if he (the settlor) retains some contingent interest in the
property until his death or thereafter, delaying until then the. ripening of full
dominion over the property by the beneficiaries." 324 U.S. 108, 112, 65 S.Ct. 508
(1945).
28 "It makes no difference how vested may be the remainder interests in the
corpus or how remote or uncertain may be the decedent's reversionary interest."
324 U.S. 113, 116, 65 S.Ct. 511 (1945).
29 Commissioner v. Bank of California, 155 F. 2d 1 (C.C.A. 9th 1946); Com-
missioner v. Bayne's Estate, 155 F. 2d 475, 167 A.L.R. 436 (C.C.A. 2nd 1946);
Beach v. Busey, 156 F. 2d 496 (C.C.A. 6th 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 802;
Thomas v. Graham, 158 F. 2d 561 (C.C.A. 5th 1946).
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tion into its tax policy by Treasury Regulation.- While a
holding that such a possibility of reverter swept the entire
corpus into the taxable gross estate was not directly within
the scope of the Haflock Case, it did initiate the trend which
was culminated by the Spiegel decision.
(3). To illustrate the problem in question (3), assume that
A grants to B and his heirs a life estate for the life of A, re-
mainder over to C in fee. Upon the death of A the possession
or enjoyment of the property shifts from B or his heirs to C;
although nothing of economic consequence passes from A or
his estate, the time of vesting is conditioned on A's death."1
The estate tax being levied on transfers at death s9 it would
seem an extreme interpretation of the statute to hold it ap-
plicable when the interest transferred had been completely
and finally severed from the decedent. In Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co. 3 the Court stated, "'One may freely give his property
to another by absolute gift without subjecting himself or his
estate to a tax, but we are asked to say that this statute means
that he may not make a gift inter vivos, equally absolute and
complete, without subjecting it to a tax if the gift takes the
form of a life estate in one with, a remainder over to another
at or after the donor's death. It would require plain and com-
pelling language to justify so incongruous a result and we
think it is wanting in the present statute." It is submitted that
the Hallock Case did not overrule the Reinecke Case directly,
nor did it give rise to a reasonable inference that it was over-
ruled. At any rate, the most recent test still relies on the
presence of an interest in the grantor to determine taxability.
This was the state of the law ,from the time of the Hailock
decision to the Spiegel and Church Cases; the uncertainties
30 A transfer of property by decedent during his life is intended to take effect
in possession or:enjoyment at or after his death, and such property is includable
in his gross estate if "... (2) the decedent or his estate possesses any right or
interest in the property (whether arising by the express terms of the instrument
of transfer or otherwise)." U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, Sec. 81.17 (as amended by T.D.
5512, May 1, 1946).
al Problematic transfers of intermediate -concern are those where the death
of.the grantor may determine when the benefits will shift, as in question (3), and
may also determine who will benefit, as in question (2), e.g., A conveys to B for
life, if A predeceases B, remainder to B in fee; but if B predecease A, remainder
to C in fee.
A2 Cf. Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 50, 44 S.Ct. 291 (1924); Edwards v. Slo-
cum, 264 U.S. 61, 62, 4.4 S.Ct. 293 (1924); N. Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,
349, 41 S.Ct. 506 (1921).
3278 U. S. 339, 347, 49 S.Ct. 123 (1929).
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stated above had been inconsistently treated by the lower
federal courts, and a uniform rule of treatment was desirable.
CONCLUSIONS
Question (1), above, is directly answered by the Church
decision, holding that May v. Heiner and the Hailock Case are
in irreconcilable conflict and that the latter controls. This ju-
dicial construction is retroactively applied by the Court, and
it is distinguished from their earlier refusal to allow the
retroactive operation of the resolution and amendment. in the
Hassett and Marshal Cases.8" As a result any transfer in
trust by which the settlor retained a life esthte, regardless of
the time of creation, will subject the entire trust corpus to
inclusion in the decedent's taxable estate under section 811 (c).
Question (2) is affirmatively answered by the Spiegel de-
cision: " . . . it is immaterial whether such a present or fu-
ture interest, absolute or contingent, remains in the grantor
because he deliberately reserves it or because, without con-
sidering the consequences, he conveys away less than all of his
property ownership and attributes, present or prospective."
Any interest, thread or tie remaining in the grantor, no matter
how remote, will operate to bring the whole of the property
into his gross estate under 811 (c) .se
Neither the Spiegel nor the Church Case has changea the
status of the problem posed in question (3). The Spiegel Case
holds, that to avoid the incidence of the estate tax, there must
be a bona fide transfer in which the grantor 'absolutely, un-
equivocally, irrevocably, and without possible reservations,
parts with all of his title and all of his possession and all of
his enjoyment of the transferred property." S' A transfer
that would raise'question (3) would certainly meet this test.
But the conclusion that such a transfer is beyond the reach of
estate taxation under the present statute anticipates no further
extension of the logic of the Spiegel Case. It is submitted that
although a donor divest himself of all rights, interests and in-
cidents in property by an inter vivos transfer, the conveyance
84 Note 6, suprm.
85335 U.S. 701, 69 S.Ct. 301,3038 (1949).
86 The Court refused to apply the maxim of de minimus non curat lez despite
its forceful presentation by Mr. Justice Burton in his dissent. 885 U.s. 701, 69
S.Ct. 801, 803 (1949).
8? 385 U.S. 701, 69 S.Ct. 801, 303 (1949).
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might be interpreted as testamentary in character if the death
of the grantor effects a shift in possession or enjoyment of
the property to a remainderman. When studied in the light
of its historical interpretation by the Supreme Court, the es-
tate tax law could inevitably reach this extreme result if it
is to achieve the ultimate objective: "to subject all property
to a death duty once in a generation."
RONALD W. WHEELER
JOHN A. STAPLES
THIRD YEAR LAW STUDENTS
38 GLASON AND OTIS, INHEITANCz TAXATION p. 9 (4th ed. 1925).
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